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Institutions, théories du changement institutionnel et déterminant de la qualité des institutions: les enseignements de la littérature économique

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  • Joseph Keneck Massil

Abstract

Given the lack of universally accepted definition of the word institution, studying the institutional change as well as the determinants of institutional quality remains a difficult and even perilous exercise. Therefore, this article aims to achieve a threefold objective. First, it proposes a definition of the term institution. Second, it reviews the extensive literature on the theories of institutional change. Third, it highlights the existent empirical literature on the determinants of institutional quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Keneck Massil, 2016. "Institutions, théories du changement institutionnel et déterminant de la qualité des institutions: les enseignements de la littérature économique," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-4, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2016-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institutions; Institutional change theory; Determinants of institutional quality.;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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