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Institutions, théories du changement institutionnel et déterminant de la qualité des institutions: les enseignements de la littérature économique

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  • Joseph Keneck Massil

Abstract

Given the lack of universally accepted definition of the word institution, studying the institutional change as well as the determinants of institutional quality remains a difficult and even perilous exercise. Therefore, this article aims to achieve a threefold objective. First, it proposes a definition of the term institution. Second, it reviews the extensive literature on the theories of institutional change. Third, it highlights the existent empirical literature on the determinants of institutional quality.

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  • Joseph Keneck Massil, 2016. "Institutions, théories du changement institutionnel et déterminant de la qualité des institutions: les enseignements de la littérature économique," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-4, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2016-4
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institutions; Institutional change theory; Determinants of institutional quality.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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