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Governance and Development

  • Jean-Marie Baland

    ()

    (Center for Research in the Economics of Development, University of Namur)

  • Karl-Ove Moene
  • James A. Robinson

In this paper we discuss whether or not `governance' is an important source of variation in development experiences. We draw four main conclusions. First, governance is best thought of a sub-set of `institutions' and as such emphasis on governance is consistent with much recent academic work. Nevertheless, governance is a quite vague rubric which it is difficult to unbundle. Second, the governance of a society is the outcome of a political process and as such is closely related to the literature on the political economy of development. Third, improving governance necessitates understanding the nature of the entire political equilibrium. Finally, an important research frontier is understanding the forces that create or impeded endogenous changes in governance.

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File URL: http://www.fundp.ac.be/eco/economie/recherche/wpseries/wp/1007.pdf
File Function: First version, 2009
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Paper provided by University of Namur, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1007.

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Length: 88 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nam:wpaper:1007
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