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Governance and Development

  • Baland, Jean-Marie
  • Moene, Karl Ove
  • Robinson, James A.

In this chapter, we discuss whether or not governance is an important source of variation in development experiences. We draw four main conclusions. First, governance is best thought of a subset of institutions and as such emphasis on governance is consistent with much recent academic work. Nevertheless, governance is a quite vague rubric which is difficult to unbundle. Second, the governance of a society is the outcome of a political process and as such is closely related to the literature on the political economy of development. Third, improving governance necessitates understanding the nature of the entire political equilibrium. Finally, an important research frontier is understanding the forces that create or impeded endogenous changes in governance.

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This chapter was published in:
  • Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), 2010. "Handbook of Development Economics," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 5, number 6, January.
  • This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Development Economics with number v:5:y:2010:i:c:p:4597-4656.
    Handle: RePEc:eee:devchp:v:5:y:2010:i:c:p:4597-4656
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description

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