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Political Reform

Author

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  • Robert H. Bates

Abstract

In the last decade of the 20th Century, Africa joined the Third Wave of Democratization. Military regimes gave way to civilian governments, and no- and single-party systems to competitive political systems. The paper describes this transition; presents and evaluates two of the major explanations of it; and examines its impact on the policy choices of Africa’s governments. While reform made governments more accountable, it concludes, it may well have created incentives for them to adopt policies that destabilize the macro-economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert H. Bates, 2005. "Political Reform," CID Working Papers 114, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cid:wpfacu:114
    as

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    File URL: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/faculty-working-papers/114.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven A. Block & Karen E. Ferree & Smita Singh, 2003. "Multiparty Competition, Founding Elections and Political Business Cycles in Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 12(3), pages 444-468, September.
    2. Humphreys, Macartan & Bates, Robert, 2005. "Political Institutions and Economic Policies: Lessons from Africa," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 403-428, July.
    3. Przeworski,Adam & Alvarez,Michael E. & Cheibub,Jose Antonio & Limongi,Fernando, 2000. "Democracy and Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521793797, June.
    4. Block, Steven A., 2002. "Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the case of Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 205-228, February.
    5. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    6. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    7. Przeworski,Adam & Alvarez,Michael E. & Cheibub,Jose Antonio & Limongi,Fernando, 2000. "Democracy and Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521790321, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    development; Africa; political economy; institutions; democratization; macro-economic policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E30 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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