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Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence

  • Jakob Haan


  • Jeroen Klomp

Until recently, most research on political budget cycles was based on the (often implicit) presumption that these cycles do not differ across countries. However, more recent studies focus on heterogeneity. This paper surveys studies examining the factors conditioning the occurrence and strength of manipulation of fiscal policy for electoral purposes, at the aggregate level or at the level of a particular type of government expenditure. Conditioning factors discussed include: the level of development, institutional quality, age and level of democracy, electoral rules and form of government, transparency of the political process, the presence of checks and balances, and fiscal rules. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 157 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 387-410

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:157:y:2013:i:3:p:387-410
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0106-6
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