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Determinants of local governments'­ reelection: New evidence based on a Bayesian approach

  • Maria Teresa Balaguer-Coll

    ()

    (Department of Finance and Accounting, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)

  • María Isabel Brun-Martos

    ()

    (Department of Finance and Accounting, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)

  • Anabel Forte

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)

  • Emili Tortosa-Ausina

    ()

    (IVIE, Valencia and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)

This paper analyzes the effect of public spending on the probability of municipal reelection of Spanish local governments during the 2000-2007 period, using Bayesian techniques. The results indicate that, in general, increases in local government spending positively impact on the chances of reelection of local governments. Moreover, the capital expenditure over the whole period affects positively to the reelection probability, although the pre-electoral one is preferred, and the electorate rewards increases in current expenditures only in the period before elections. The use of Bayesian techniques is particularly interesting, since results are not boiled down to a summary effect such as the average; on the contrary, it shows exactly how a given covariate affects the probability of being reelected.

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Paper provided by Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain) in its series Working Papers with number 2014/06.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:jau:wpaper:2014/06
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