Endogenous Elections, Electoral Budget Cycles and Canadian Provincial Governments
The existence of manipulative electoral budget cycles and opportunistic election setting is examined in the framework of a parliamentary democracy. Empirical tests are conducted using a pooled time series cross section data set derived from Canadian provincial governments over the 1962-92 period. Evidence in support of the electoral budget cycle hypothesis, but not the opportunistic election timing hypothesis, is obtained. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Volume (Year): 97 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:97:y:1998:i:1-2:p:35-48. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.