Multiparty Competition, Founding Elections and Political Business Cycles in Africa
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- Steven A. Block & Smita Singh & Karen E. Ferree, 2001. "Multiparty Competition, Founding Elections and Political Business Cycles in Africa," CID Working Papers 80A, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- N17 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Africa; Oceania
- O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O23 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
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