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Political Cycles in Public Expenditure: Butter vs Guns

  • Bove, Vincenzo

    ()

    (University of Essex)

  • Efthyvoulou, Georgios

    ()

    (University of Sheffield)

This paper investigates how the timing of elections and government ideological motivations influence the dynamics of social and military expenditure in a panel of 22 OECD countries over the period 1988-2008. Three basic results emerge: First, governments tend to bias outlays towards social expenditure and away from military expenditure at election times. Second, membership in the NATO alliance affects the timing of election-driven military spending manipulations. Third, partisan distinctions are clearly discernible but differ between the two types of expenditure: while certain categories of social expenditure are higher during left administrations, military expenditure are higher during right administrations.

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Paper provided by Network of European Peace Scientists in its series NEPS Working Papers with number 7/2013.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 09 Oct 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:nepswp:2013_007
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.europeanpeacescientists.org/

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