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Institutional Determinants of Military Spending

  • Germà Bel

    ()

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona)

  • Ferran Elias-Moreno

    (Department of Economics, Columbia University)

Drawing on a database for 1988-2006 containing information on 157 countries, we investigate the effects on military spending of government form, electoral rules, concentration of parliamentary parties, and ideology. From an OLS regression on pooled data, our results show that presidential democracies spend more than parliamentary systems on defense, whereas the presence of a plurality voting system will reduce the defense burden. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to theoretical predictions in the literature, institutions do not have the same impact on the provision of all public goods. We present as well evidence regarding the effect of ideology on defense spending.

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File URL: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2009/200922.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics in its series IREA Working Papers with number 200922.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision: Oct 2009
Handle: RePEc:ira:wpaper:200922
Contact details of provider: Postal: Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona
Web page: http://www.ub.edu/irea/
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