Military Expenditure in Post-Conflict Societies
Post-conflict situations face a high risk of reversion to conflict. We investigate the effect of military expenditure by the government during the first decade post-conflict on the risk of reversion. We contrast two theories as to the likely effects. In one, military spending deters conflict by reducing the prospects of rebel success. In the other it acts as a signal to the rebels of government intentions. In the signalling model, low military spending signals that the government intends to adhere to the terms of the peace settlement and so reduces the risk of renewed rebellion. We investigate the effects of post- conflict military spending on the risk of conflict, using our existing models of military expenditure and of conflict risk. We find that, consistent with the signalling model, high military spending post- conflict significantly increases the risk of renewed conflict. This effect of military spending is distinctive to post-conflict period, and becomes progressively more pronounced over the decade.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Malcolm Knight & Norman Loayza & Delano Villanueva, 1996.
"The Peace Dividend: Military Spending Cuts and Economic Growth,"
IMF Staff Papers,
Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(1), pages 1-37, March.
- Malcolm D. Knight & Delano Villanueva & Norman Loayza, 1995. "The Peace Dividend; Military Spending Cuts and Economic Growth," IMF Working Papers 95/53, International Monetary Fund.
- Knight, Malcolm & Loayza, Norman & Villanueva, Delano, 1996. "The peace dividend : military spending cuts and economic growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1577, The World Bank.
- Walter, Barbara F., 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(03), pages 335-364, June.
- Omar M. G. Keshk, 2003. "CDSIMEQ: A program to implement two-stage probit least squares," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 3(2), pages 157-167, June.
- Paul Collier & V. L. Elliott & Håvard Hegre & Anke Hoeffler & Marta Reynal-Querol & Nicholas Sambanis, 2003. "Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 13938, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)