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Government Spending Cycles: Ideological or Opportunistic?

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  • van Dalen, Hendrik P
  • Swank, Otto H

Abstract

This paper examines whether partisan and opportunistic motives affect government expenditure growth in the Netherlands. The time series analysis, covering the period 1953-93, allows for different types of government spending. In general, spending is inspired by ideological and opportunistic motives: all government expenditure categories show an upward drift during election times and the 'partisan' motives behind government spending are clearly revealed: cabinets attach greater importance to social security and healthcare than right-wing cabinets and right-wing cabinets value expenditure on infrastructure and defense more than left-wing parties. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • van Dalen, Hendrik P & Swank, Otto H, 1996. "Government Spending Cycles: Ideological or Opportunistic?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 89(1-2), pages 183-200, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:89:y:1996:i:1-2:p:183-200
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    2. Makkonen, Teemu, 2013. "Government science and technology budgets in times of crisis," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 817-822.
    3. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke & Simone Winterer, 2015. "Das Wachstum der Verteidigungsausgaben in Deutschland (1951–2011): Welchen Einfluss haben die Parteien?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 68(10), pages 19-26, May.
    4. Christos Kollias & Suzanna-Maria Paleologou, 2003. "Domestic political and external security determinants of the demand for greek military expenditure," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 437-445.
    5. Pantelis Kammas, 2011. "Strategic fiscal interaction among OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 459-480, June.
    6. Ana Barreira & Rui Nuno Baleiras, "undated". "Cycles On Public Expenditure Composition Within the European Union," Regional and Urban Modeling 283600004, EcoMod.
    7. Blerta Zilja & Manjola Naco, 2013. "The Performance of Public Investments During Fiscal Consolidation in Albania," Romanian Economic Journal, Department of International Business and Economics from the Academy of Economic Studies Bucharest, vol. 16(48), pages 241-258, June.
    8. Jakob Haan & Jan Sturm & Bernd Sikken, 1996. "Government capital formation: Explaining the decline," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 132(1), pages 55-74, March.
    9. Bos, Frits, 2006. "De Nederlandse collectieve uitgaven in historisch perspectief
      [Dutch public expenditure in historical perspective]
      ," MPRA Paper 40602, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Bharatee Dash & Angara Raja, 2013. "Do political determinants affect the size and composition of public expenditure? A study of the Indian states," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 60(3), pages 293-317, September.
    11. Abel Fran çois & Raul Magni-Berton, 2015. "Partisan and bureaucratic changes in public education spending. French empirical evidence," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(18), pages 1435-1438, December.
    12. Cousins, Mel, 2007. "Political budget cycles and social security budget increases in the Republic of Ireland, 1923-2005," MPRA Paper 5359, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Zohal Hessami, 2013. "Corruption, Public Procurement, and the Budget Composition: Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-27, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    14. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
    15. Bove, Vincenzo & Efthyvoulou, Georgios & Navas, Antonio, 2017. "Political cycles in public expenditure: butter vs guns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 582-604.
    16. Beate Jochimsen & Robert Lehmann, 2017. "On the political economy of national tax revenue forecasts: evidence from OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 211-230, March.
    17. repec:hal:journl:hal-01291401 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Hessami, Zohal, 2014. "Political corruption, public procurement, and budget composition: Theory and evidence from OECD countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 372-389.
    19. Bharatee Dash & Angara Raja, 2014. "Do political determinants affect revenue collection? Evidence from the Indian states," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(3), pages 253-278, September.
    20. Kausik Chaudhuri & Sugato Dasgupta, 2005. "The political determinants of central governments' economic policies in India: an empirical investigation," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(7), pages 957-978.
    21. Peter Zweifel, 2006. "Auftrag und Grenzen der Sozialen Krankenversicherung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(s1), pages 5-26, May.
    22. Hessami, Zohal, 2010. "Corruption and the Composition of Public Expenditures: Evidence from OECD Countries," MPRA Paper 25945, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Dash, Bharatee Bhusana & Raja, Angara V., 2012. "Political Determinants of the Allocation of Public Expenditures: A Study of the Indian States," Working Papers 12/101, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    24. Bischoff, Ivo & Gohout, Wolfgang, 2006. "Tax projections in German states – manipulated by opportunistic incumbent parties?," Finanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere 74, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften.

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