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Political budget cycles and election outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • Jeroen Klomp
  • Jakob Haan

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Abstract

This paper addresses two empirical questions. Is fiscal policy affected by upcoming elections? If so, do election-motivated fiscal policies enhance the probability of re-election of the incumbent? Employing data for 65 democratic countries over 1975–2005 in a semi-pooled panel model, we find that in most countries fiscal policy is hardly affected by elections. The countries for which we find a significant political budget cycle are very diverse. They include ‘young’ democracies but also ‘established’ democracies. In countries with a political budget cycle, election-motivated fiscal policies have a significant positive (but fairly small) effect on the electoral support for the political parties in government. Copyright The Author(s) 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Jeroen Klomp & Jakob Haan, 2013. "Political budget cycles and election outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 245-267, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:157:y:2013:i:1:p:245-267
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9943-y
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-012-9943-y
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    2. Manjhi, Ganesh & Keswani Mehra, Meeta, 2016. "Center-State Political Transfer Cycles in India," MPRA Paper 70784, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Niklas Potrafke & Markus Reischmann & Marina Riem & Christoph Schinke & David Streich, 2014. "Wirtschaftslage und Regierungsideologie in Europa," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 67(09), pages 18-25, May.
    4. Reischmann, Markus, 2016. "Creative accounting and electoral motives: Evidence from OECD countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 243-257.
    5. Kantorowicz, Jarosław, 2017. "Electoral systems and fiscal policy outcomes: Evidence from Poland," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 36-60.
    6. Bove, Vincenzo & Efthyvoulou, Georgios & Navas, Antonio, 2017. "Political cycles in public expenditure: butter vs guns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 582-604.
    7. Achten-Gozdowski, Jennifer, 2018. "Geschichte und Politökonomie deutscher Theatersubventionen
      [History and Political Economy of Public Subsidies for German Theatres and Operas]
      ," MPRA Paper 85087, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Klein, Fabio Alvim & Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko, 2015. "Term limits and political budget cycles at the local level: evidence from a young democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 21-36.
    9. Antoine Cazals & Pierre Mandon, 2015. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation of Leaders or Bias from Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers halshs-01238883, HAL.
    10. Antoine CAZALS & Pierre MANDON, 2016. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation from Leaders or Manipulation from Researchers? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers 201609, CERDI.
    11. Whitaker, Stephan & Ergungor, O. Emre, 2016. "Premium Municipal Bonds and Issuer Fiscal Distress," Working Paper 1534, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    12. Antoine Cazals & Pierre Mandon, 2016. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation from Leaders or Manipulation from Researchers? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers halshs-01320586, HAL.
    13. repec:eee:poleco:v:52:y:2018:i:c:p:55-74 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Jan Janků, 2016. "Podmíněný politicko-rozpočtový cyklus v zemích OECD
      [Conditional Political Budget Cycle in the OECD Countries]
      ," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2016(1), pages 65-82.
    15. Marc-Daniel Moessinger, 2014. "Do the personal characteristics of finance ministers affect changes in public debt?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 183-207, October.
    16. Klomp, Jeroen & de Haan, Jakob, 2016. "Election cycles in natural resource rents: Empirical evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 79-93.
    17. Pantelis Kammas & Vassilis Sarantides, 2016. "Fiscal redistribution around elections when democracy is not “the only game in town”," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 279-311, September.
    18. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
    19. Toke Aidt & Graham Mooney, 2014. "Voter suffrage and the political budget cycle: evidence from the London Metropolitan Boroughs 1902-1937," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1401, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    20. Toke Aidt & Graham Mooney, 2014. "Voting Suffrage and the Political Budget Cycle: Evidence from the London Metropolitan Boroughs 1902-1937," CESifo Working Paper Series 4614, CESifo Group Munich.
    21. Klomp, Jeroen & de Haan, Jakob, 2013. "Popular protest and political budget cycles: A panel data analysis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 516-520.
    22. Findley, T. Scott, 2015. "Hyperbolic memory discounting and the political business cycle," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 345-359.
    23. repec:eee:poleco:v:52:y:2018:i:c:p:166-191 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2017. "When and why do countries break their national fiscal rules?," Working Papers 01/2017, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Election outcomes; Political budget cycles; Multilevel model; E62; H62;

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

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