Why has the Stability and Growth Pact Failed?
This paper evaluates the Stability and Growth Pact. After briefly examining the rules in place and the experience so far, the Pact is analysed from a political economy perspective, focusing on the choice of hard versus soft law and drawing inferences from characteristics of successful fiscal rules at the state level in the USA. The main argument of the paper is that the Pact's enforcement mechanisms are too weak. It is also argued that big countries are less likely to adhere to the fiscal policy rules in place. Reform of the Pact should aim at stricter, instead of more flexible, rules and should not rely on cyclically adjusted deficit estimates. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 7 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (07)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1367-0271|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1367-0271|