Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal Adjustment?
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- Buti, Marco & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Franco, Daniele, 2003. "Revisiting the stability and growth pact: grand design or internal adjustment?," Seminarios y Conferencias 6567, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
- Marco Buti & Sylvester Eijffinger & Daniele Franco, 2003. "Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: grand design or internal adjustment?," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 180, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
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More about this item
Keywordseconomic and monetary union; fiscal policy; fiscal rules; stability and growth pact;
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
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