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Évolutions et asymétries des règles européennes de politique budgétaire et mise en oeuvre du Pacte de stabilité

  • Sébastien Pommier
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    [eng] Trends and Assymmetries in European Budget Policy Rules and Implementation of the Stability Pact . . The stability pact is a rule of budget discipline which recommends relinquishing contra-cyclical activism in favour of automatic stabilisers in order to regulate the economic cycle . This article seeks to describe the budget rules followed by European governments since 1970 in order to test the reliability of the stability pact approach . The results show that the primary balance becomes more inert and has a greater corrective effect on debt trends from 1992 . Debt correction seems to be attributable to discretionary policies . Disciplined budget rules nevertheless display a certain cyclical assymmetry : discretionary policy seems to be pro-cyclical during slowdowns and acyclical during recoveries . Automatic stabilisers are also less extensive during economic downturns . Key-words : stability and growth pact , budget rules , EMU [fre] Le Pacte de stabilité constitue une règle de discipline budgétaire qui recommande l ’ abandon de l ’ activisme contra-cyclique au profit des stabilisateurs automatiques pour opérer la régulation conjoncturelle . Cet article tente de représenter les règles budgétaires suivies par les gouvernements européens depuis 1970 afin de tester la fiabilité de cette ligne de conduite . Les résultats montrent que le solde primaire devient plus inerte et corrige davantage l ’ évolution de la dette à partir de 1992 . La correction de la dette semble imputable aux politiques discrétionnaires . Les règles budgétaires disciplinées révèlent néanmoins une certaine asymétrie conjoncturelle : la politique discrétionnaire apparaît pro-cyclique durant les ralentissements et acyclique durant les reprises . L ’ ampleur des stabilisateurs automatiques est également moindre en période de basse conjoncture . Mots-clés : pacte de stabilité et de croissance , règles budgétaires , UEM

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    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

    Volume (Year): 162 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 95-109

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2004_num_162_1_6935
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2004.6935
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecop

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