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The End of the Stability and Growth Pact?

  • Jakob de Haan
  • Helge Berger
  • David-Jan Jansen

This paper evaluates the Stability and Growth Pact. After examining the rules in place and the experience so far, the Pact is analysed from a political economy perspective, focusing on the choice for so-called soft law and drawing inferences from characteristics of successful fiscal rules at the state level in the United States. It is also examined whether big and small countries are likely to adhere to fiscal policy rules in place. Furthermore, the impact of the business cycle on fiscal policy outcomes is analysed. Finally, the proposals of the European Commission to strengthen the Pact are discussed.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1093.

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Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1093
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  1. Dermot Hodson & Imelda Maher, 2001. "The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(4), pages 719-746, November.
  2. Albert Jaeger & Ludger Schuknecht, 2007. "Boom-Bust Phases in Asset Prices and Fiscal Policy Behavior," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 43(6), pages 45-66, November.
  3. M. Buti & D. Franco & H. Ongena, 1997. "Budgetary Policies during Recessions - Retrospective Application of the "Stability and Growth Pact" to the Post-War Period," European Economy - Economic Papers 121, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
  4. Thomas Dalsgaard & Alain de Serres, 1999. "Estimating Prudent Budgetary Margins for 11 EU Countries: A Simulated SVAR Model Approach," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 216, OECD Publishing.
  5. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & de Haan, J., 2000. "European Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Other publications TiSEM a056022b-c6b1-4c89-bcd5-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  6. George Kopits & Helge Berger & István P. Székely, 2004. "Fiscal Indulgence in Central Europe: Loss of the External Anchor," IMF Working Papers 04/62, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rose, Andrew K, 1996. "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria," CEPR Discussion Papers 1473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 65-113, 04.
  9. Jordi Gali & Roberto Perotti, 2003. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe," NBER Working Papers 9773, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Artis, Michael J & Zhang, Wenda, 1999. "Further Evidence on the International Business Cycle and the ERM: Is There a European Business Cycle?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 120-32, January.
  11. André Sapir & Marco Buti, 1998. "Economic policy in EMU," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8078, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  12. Buti, Marco & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Franco, Daniele, 2003. "Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal Adjustment?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3692, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. von Hagen, Jürgen, 2003. "Fiscal discipline and growth in Euroland: Experiences with the stability and growth pact," ZEI Working Papers B 06-2003, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  14. Marco BUTI & Daniele FRANCO & Hedwig ONGENA, 1997. "Budgeetary Policies during Recessions : Retrospective Application of the Stability and Growth Pact†to the Post-War Period," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1997041, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  15. Jordi GalÌ & Roberto Perotti, 2003. "Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 18(37), pages 533-572, October.
  16. Marco Buti & Paul van den Noord, 2003. "Discretionary Fiscal Policy and Elections: The Experience of the Early Years of EMU," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 351, OECD Publishing.
  17. A.J. Hughes Hallett & Peter McAdam, 2003. "Deficit Targeting Strategies: Fiscal Consolidation and the Probability Distribution of Deficits under the Stability Pact," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 421-444, 06.
  18. Inklaar, Robert & de Haan, Jakob, 2001. "Is There Really a European Business Cycle? A Comment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(2), pages 215-20, April.
  19. Robert P. Inman, 1996. "Do Balanced Budget Rules Work? U.S. Experience and Possible Lessons for the EMU," NBER Working Papers 5838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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