A Emenda Da Reeleição E A Lei De Responsabilidade Fiscal: Impactos Sobre Ciclos Políticos E Performance Fiscal Dos Estados (1986-2002)
This paper analyses the effects of two recent institutional changes, the "Reelection Amendment" and the Law of Fiscal Responsibility, on political budget cycles and fiscal performance of Brazilian federal states. The empirical evidence shows that (1) contrarily to previous results, the Reelection increased public spending and debt level of states in electoral years; (2) the Law of Fiscal Responsibility significantly decreased the functionalism spending and capital revenue, and, on the other hand, increased the tax revenue of states.
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