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A Emenda Da Reeleição E A Lei De Responsabilidade Fiscal: Impactos Sobre Ciclos Políticos E Performance Fiscal Dos Estados (1986-2002)

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  • Marcos Yamada Nakaguma
  • Siegfried Bender

Abstract

This paper analyses the effects of two recent institutional changes, the "Reelection Amendment" and the Law of Fiscal Responsibility, on political budget cycles and fiscal performance of Brazilian federal states. The empirical evidence shows that (1) contrarily to previous results, the Reelection increased public spending and debt level of states in electoral years; (2) the Law of Fiscal Responsibility significantly decreased the functionalism spending and capital revenue, and, on the other hand, increased the tax revenue of states.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcos Yamada Nakaguma & Siegfried Bender, 2004. "A Emenda Da Reeleição E A Lei De Responsabilidade Fiscal: Impactos Sobre Ciclos Políticos E Performance Fiscal Dos Estados (1986-2002)," Anais do XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 32nd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 025, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2004:025
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    5. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2002. "Conditional Political Budget Cycles," CEPR Discussion Papers 3352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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