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A Emenda Da Reeleição E A Lei De Responsabilidade Fiscal: Impactos Sobre Ciclos Políticos E Performance Fiscal Dos Estados (1986-2002)

  • Marcos Yamada Nakaguma
  • Siegfried Bender
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    This paper analyses the effects of two recent institutional changes, the "Reelection Amendment" and the Law of Fiscal Responsibility, on political budget cycles and fiscal performance of Brazilian federal states. The empirical evidence shows that (1) contrarily to previous results, the Reelection increased public spending and debt level of states in electoral years; (2) the Law of Fiscal Responsibility significantly decreased the functionalism spending and capital revenue, and, on the other hand, increased the tax revenue of states.

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    File URL: http://www.anpec.org.br/encontro2004/artigos/A04A025.pdf
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    Paper provided by ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics] in its series Anais do XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 32th Brazilian Economics Meeting] with number 025.

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    Date of creation: 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:anp:en2004:025
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    1. K. Schoors & K. Sonin, 2003. "Passive Creditors," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 03/177, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    2. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2001. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262232197, June.
    3. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1986. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics With Rational Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 2051, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Moritz Kraemer, 1997. "Electoral Budget Cycles in Latin America and the Caribbean: Incidence, Causes, and Political Futility," Research Department Publications 4084, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    6. Lindbeck, Assar, 1976. "Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 1-19, May.
    7. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Do Electoral Cycles Differ Across Political Systems?," Working Papers 232, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    8. Jeferson Luis Bittencourt & Ronald Otto Hillbrecht, 2003. "Ciclo Político na Economia Brasileira: um Teste para a Execução Orçamentária dos Governos Estaduais - 1983/2000," Anais do XXXI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 31th Brazilian Economics Meeting] b32, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    9. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2002. "Conditional Political Budget Cycles," CEPR Discussion Papers 3352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in A Young Democracy Setting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1301-1338, November.
    11. Blais, Andre & Nadeau, Richard, 1992. " The Electoral Budget Cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 389-403, December.
    12. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    13. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    14. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
    15. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 25-45, March.
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