Majoritarian exploitation of the fiscal commons: general taxes-differential transfers
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- Hillman, Arye L. & Metsuyanim, Kfir & Potrafke, Niklas, 2015.
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- Arye L. Hillman & Kfir Metsuyanim & Niklas Potrafke, 2015. "Democracy with Group Identity," CESifo Working Paper Series 5281, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2014. "Households, Markets and Public Choice," CESifo Working Paper Series 4947, CESifo Group Munich.
- Schaltegger, Christoph A. & Feld, Lars P., 2009. "Do large cabinets favor large governments? Evidence on the fiscal commons problem for Swiss Cantons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 35-47, February.
- Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger, 2010.
"Political stability and fiscal policy: time series evidence for the Swiss federal level since 1849,"
Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 505-534, September.
- Lars P. Feld & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2009. "Political Stability and Fiscal Policy - Time Series Evidence for the Swiss Federal Level since 1849," CESifo Working Paper Series 2691, CESifo Group Munich.
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