IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Majoritarian Management of the Commons


  • Buchanan, James M
  • Yoon, Yong J


This article analyzes usage of a common property resource, "the commons," under collectivization as compared with more familiar privatization institutional arrangements. Particular emphasis is on majority decision rules. When separate majority coalitions may authorize simultaneous usage of a common resource, total value is dissipated, but the interdependencies introduced by possible membership in differing coalitions to an extent reduce the incentives for exploitation. The formal analysis is analogous to that familiar in Cournot-Nash duopoly-oligopoly models but with differing efficiency implications. The argument has relevance for differential-benefit public spending from general tax sources, as well as other applications. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Buchanan, James M & Yoon, Yong J, 2001. "Majoritarian Management of the Commons," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(3), pages 396-405, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:39:y:2001:i:3:p:396-405

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Pindyck, Robert S, 1991. "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 29(3), pages 1110-1148, September.
    2. Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, 1994. "Investment under Uncertainty," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 5474, June.
    3. Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, 1993. "Sectoral Shocks, Learning, and Aggregate Fluctuations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 777-794.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Buchanan, James M. & Yoon, Yong J., 2004. "Majoritarian exploitation of the fiscal commons: general taxes-differential transfers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 73-90, March.
    2. Dean Tjosvold & Ann Peng & Yi Chen & Fang Su, 2008. "Business and government interdependence in China: Cooperative goals to develop industries and the marketplace," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 225-249, June.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:39:y:2001:i:3:p:396-405. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.