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Politics with(out) Coase

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  • Barbara Luppi
  • Francesco Parisi

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2012. "Politics with(out) Coase," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 175-187, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:59:y:2012:i:2:p:175-187
    DOI: 10.1007/s12232-012-0153-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. De Bornier, Jean Magnan, 1986. "The Coase theorem and the empty core: A reexamination," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 265-271, December.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    3. Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June.
    4. Parisi, Francesco, 2003. "Political Coase Theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(1-2), pages 1-36, April.
    5. Peter Bernholz, 1982. "Externalities as a Necessary Condition for Cyclical Social Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 699-705.
    6. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alex Robson, 2014. "Transaction costs can encourage Coasean bargaining," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 539-549, September.
    2. ., 2019. "Economic theory of non-territorial unbundling," Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit, chapter 1, pages 14-38, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. A. Nicita & M. Rizzolli & H. Smith, 2012. "Exploring Coase’s world: an introduction," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 111-120, July.
    4. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    5. Trent J. MacDonald, 2019. "The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18871.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Coase theorem; Political externalities; Bargaining externalities; Cyclicality; C70; D23; D60; D80;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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