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Logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities

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  • Peter Bernholz

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  • Peter Bernholz, 1973. "Logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 87-95, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:15:y:1973:i:1:p:87-95
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718844
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anthony Downs, 1961. "Problems of Majority Voting: In Defense of Majority Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69, pages 192-192.
    2. Tullock, Gordon, 1970. "A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 419-426, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Casella, Alessandra & Turban, Sébastien, 2014. "Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 47-70.
    2. Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 417-446, September.
    3. Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2012. "Politics with(out) Coase," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 175-187, July.
    4. Alessandra Casella & Antonin Macé, 2021. "Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 57-86, August.
    5. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas & Turban, Sébastien, 2014. "Vote trading with and without party leaders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 115-128.
    6. Mario Gilli & Yuan Li & Jiwei Qian, 2018. "Logrolling under fragmented authoritarianism: theory and evidence from China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 197-214, April.
    7. Jeffrey Weiss, 1988. "Is vote-selling desirable?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 177-194, November.
    8. Knoll Bodo & Koenig Andreas, 2011. "Leviathan Europa – Stärkung der Nationalstaaten und der EU durch konstitutionelle Schranken?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 60(2), pages 127-145, August.
    9. Dur, Robert A. J. & Swank, Otto H., 1998. "The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 561-572, August.
    10. Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, 2000. "A Problem with Referendums," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(1), pages 5-31, January.
    11. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2021. "Investigation in search of truth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 223-228, March.
    12. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco & Reina, Livia, 2003. "Coalition formation in multilateral negotiations with a potential for logrolling: An experimental analysis of negotiators' cognition processes," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 17/03, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    13. William Gehrlein & Michel Breton & Dominique Lepelley, 2017. "The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 315-327, August.
    14. Charles B. Blankart, 2016. "Public Choice and Public Finance: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 5819, CESifo.
    15. Congleton, Roger D. & Tollison, Robert D., 1999. "The stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 193-205, June.
    16. Barbaro, Salvatore & Suedekum, Jens, 2006. "Reforming a complicated income tax system: The political economy perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 41-59, March.
    17. Peter Bernholz, 2012. "From The Calculus of Consent to extended logrolling, negative externalities, and the Coase theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 265-271, September.
    18. Thomas Schwartz, 2011. "One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 197-214, July.
    19. Manfred Holler, 1980. "What is paradoxical about the voting paradox?," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 14(5), pages 679-685, October.
    20. Thiess Büttner & Michael Broer & Clemens Fuest & Christian Waldhoff & Margit Schratzenstaller & Peter Becker & Jörg Haas & Charles B. Blankart, 2017. "The Future of EU Finance: New Funding and Allocation Options?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 70(06), pages 03-25, March.
    21. Crombez, Christophe, 2000. "Spatial models of logrolling in the European Union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 707-737, November.
    22. Thomas Schwartz, 2021. "Parties," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 462-475, December.
    23. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2021. "Trading votes for votes: A laboratory study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 1-26.
    24. Sebagh Thierry, 1995. "Recherche De Rente : Jeu de Guerre et Guerre D'enjeux - II," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2-3), pages 1-20, June.
    25. Michael Reksulak & William Shughart, 2012. "What should government do? Problems of social cost, externalities and all that," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 103-114, July.

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