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Pork-Barrel Spending under Cournot Legislators and the Quantity Equation

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  • Soldatos, Gerasimos T.

Abstract

This note makes the following two points based on Cournot utility functions of the legislators and on the government budget constraint viewed from the perspective of the equation of exchange. Without logrolling, i.e. with different perceptions of the budget constraint, there can be such a legislature preference structure that can turn a pork-barrel project into welfare-enhancing public expenditure depending on economic circumstances. With logrolling, i.e. with agreement at least regarding the size of the budget, the “pork” may be taken out of the project regardless the economic conjuncture. These results are independent of the utility function used, while the use of the quantity equation serves only as the simplest macroeconomic framework in which the two general points herein may be made.

Suggested Citation

  • Soldatos, Gerasimos T., 2014. "Pork-Barrel Spending under Cournot Legislators and the Quantity Equation," MPRA Paper 61116, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:61116
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pork-barrel spending; budget deficit; quantity equation; Cournot legislators; logrolling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems

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