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Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Persistent Shocks

  • Marina Halac
  • Pierre Yared

This paper studies the optimal level of discretion in policymaking. We consider a fiscal policy model where the government has time-inconsistent preferences with a present-bias towards public spending. The government chooses a fiscal rule to trade off its desire to commit to not overspend against its desire to have flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. We analyze the optimal fiscal rule when the shocks are persistent. Unlike under i.i.d. shocks, we show that the ex-ante optimal rule is not sequentially optimal, as it provides dynamic incentives. The ex-ante optimal rule exhibits history dependence, with high shocks leading to an erosion of future fiscal discipline compared to low shocks, which lead to the reinstatement of discipline. The implied policy distortions oscillate over time given a sequence of high shocks, and can force the government to accumulate maximal debt and become immiserated in the long run.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 18545.

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Date of creation: Nov 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks Marina Halac1,2 andPierre Yared1,3,† Article first published online: 3 OCT 2014 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA11207 © 2014 The Econometric Society Issue Econometrica Econometrica Volume 82, Issue 5, pages 1557–1614, September 2014
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18545
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  18. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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