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Race to Burn the Last Ton of Carbon and the Risk of Stranded Assets

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  • Rick van der Ploeg

Abstract

A cap on global warming implies a tighter carbon budget which can be enforced with a credible second-best renewable energy subsidy designed to lock up fossil fuel and curb cumulative emissions. Such a subsidy brings forward the end of the fossil fuel era, but accelerates fossil fuel extraction and global warming in the short run. A weaker fossil fuel oligopoly implies that anticipation of a given global carbon budget induces fossil producers to deplete reserves more voraciously and accelerate global warming. This race to burn the last ton of carbon is more intensive for the feedback than open-loop Nash equilibrium, so that the Green Paradox effect of a renewable energy subsidy is stronger. There is an intermediate phase of limit pricing to keep renewable energy producers at bay, which becomes much more relevant when a cap on global warming is enforced. A stronger fossil fuel oligopoly lengthens the period of limit pricing and typically brings forward the carbon-free era. Finally, the mere risk of a cap on global warming being enforced at some unknown, future date makes fossil fuel extraction more voracious and accelerates global warming.

Suggested Citation

  • Rick van der Ploeg, 2017. "Race to Burn the Last Ton of Carbon and the Risk of Stranded Assets," CESifo Working Paper Series 6793, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6793
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    2. van der Meijden, Gerard & Benchekroun, Hassan & van der Ploeg, Frederick & Withagen, Cees, 2023. "Do strong oligopolies reverse Green Paradox effects?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    3. Jin, Wei & van der Ploeg, Frederick & Zhang, Lin, 2024. "How clean capital slows down disinvestment of carbon-intensive capital in the low-carbon transition," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    4. Lukas Folkens & Petra Schneider, 2022. "Responsible Carbon Resource Management through Input-Oriented Cap and Trade (IOCT)," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-17, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    second-best climate policy; Green Paradox; carbon budget; stranded assets; oligopolistic resource markets; limit pricing; voracious extraction; regime shift;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • Q51 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Valuation of Environmental Effects
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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