Too many or too few? On the optimal number of firms in the commons
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102825
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Other versions of this item:
- Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola & Simon, Leo K., 2023. "Too many or too few? On the optimal number of firms in the commons," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
References listed on IDEAS
- repec:bla:econom:v:53:y:1986:i:212:p:519-27 is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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