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Common Pool Equities: An Arbitrage Based Non-cooperative Solution to the Common Pool Resource Problem

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  • Ellis, Christopher J.

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  • Ellis, Christopher J., 2001. "Common Pool Equities: An Arbitrage Based Non-cooperative Solution to the Common Pool Resource Problem," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 140-155, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:42:y:2001:i:2:p:140-155
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    1. Wiggins, Steven N & Libecap, Gary D, 1985. "Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the Presence of Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 368-385, June.
    2. Charles F. Mason & Stephen Polasky, 1997. "The Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: A Dynamic Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1143-1160, November.
    3. Brown, Gardner, Jr, 1974. "An Optimal Program for Managing Common Property Resources with Congestion Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 163-173, Jan.-Feb..
    4. Richard Cornes & Charles F. Mason & Todd Sandler, 1986. "The Commons and the Optimal Number of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(3), pages 641-646.
    5. Weitzman, Martin L., 1974. "Free access vs private ownership as alternative systems for managing common property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 225-234, June.
    6. Van Der Ploeg, F., 1987. "Inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 123-145, March.
    7. Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1983. "On Commons and Tragedies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 787-792, September.
    8. Berck, Peter & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1984. "An Open-Access Fishery with Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 489-506, March.
    9. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 9, pages 178-203, Palgrave Macmillan.
    10. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Monopoly and the Rate of Extraction of Exhaustible Resources," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 655-661, September.
    11. repec:bla:econom:v:51:y:1984:i:204:p:393-400 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Anthony Scott, 1955. "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(2), pages 116-116.
    13. Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 1997. "Mitigating the Tragedy of the Commons through Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 148-172, October.
    14. Karp, Larry, 1992. "Social Welfare in a Common Property Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(2), pages 353-372, May.
    15. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 124-124.
    16. repec:bla:econom:v:44:y:1977:i:176:p:409-14 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Hackett Steven & Schlager Edella & Walker James, 1994. "The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 99-126, September.
    18. Weitzman, Martin L, 1983. "Some Macroeconomic Implications of Alternative Compensation Systems," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(372), pages 763-783, December.
    19. Robert H. Haveman, 1973. "Common Property, Congestion, and Environmental Pollution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(2), pages 278-287.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kiriti Kanjilal & Félix Muñoz-García, 2021. "Common Pool Resources with Endogenous Equity Shares," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 9(1-2), pages 103-143, July.
    2. Matthew J. Baker & Kurtis Swope, 2004. "Sharing, Gift-Giving, and Optimal Resource Use Incentives in Hunter-Gatherer Society," Departmental Working Papers 8, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
    3. Matthew J. Baker & Kurtis J. Swope, 2021. "Sharing, gift-giving, and optimal resource use in hunter-gatherer society," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 119-138, June.
    4. Aaron Adalja & Erik Lichtenberg & Elina T. Page, 2023. "Collective investment in a common pool resource: Grower associations and food safety guidelines," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(1), pages 144-173, January.

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