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Controling externalities with asymmetric information : Ferrous Scrap Recycling and the Gold Rush Problem

  • Ignace Adant

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Pierre Fleckinger

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

Nous proposons un modèle de l'organisation monopsonistique d'une filière de recyclage des métaux ferreux. Ce type d'activité se distingue par des externalités négatives propres à la collecte et de fortes asymétries d'information sur la qualité des matières collectées. Après avoir mis en lumière un effet de "ruée vers l'or" - la relation entre le niveau de prix et les externalités négatives de collecte - nous expliquons comment un recycleur monopsoneur régule l'activité de collecte en contrôlant le degré d'asymétrie d'information. En particulier, plus la valeur d'une ferraille est élevée, plus les asymétries d'information doivent être importantes. En termes de bien-être, ceci peut être efficace mais induit un dilemme équité-efficacité, lequel est d'autant plus marqué que l'on intègre la dimension environnementale du problème.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00243017.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243017
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