Market Rent Dissipation In Regulated Open Access Fisheries
Using a new model of markets in regulated open access resources, we illustrate the evolution of a fishery as demand for the product grows. We show that increased demand for fish in its fresh form shortens the fishing season and leads to the development of a market for processed fish. The model allows us to calculate the rent gains from rationalizing the fishery, and we show that much of the rent gains come on the market side as the season lengthens and more fish can be delivered to the higher-valued fresh market.
|Date of creation:||2000|
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