Equilibrium Prices in a Vertically Coordinated Fishery
Competition among processing firms is analyzed in a fishery that is managed under a total allowable catch constraint. Firms compete first in the ex-vessel market for round fish and then in the downstream consumer market. Nash equilibrium prices are characterized at each stage of the vertical market. When the number of processors is sufficiently large, equilibrium prices are approximately Walrasian. The ex-vessel price is close to the processor marginal valuation of the round fish and the consumer price clears the total quantity of processed fish. Implications for market structure, conduct and performance, and fisheries management policy are drawn.
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|Date of creation:||01 May 1999|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, May 1999, vol. 37, pp. 290-305|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070|
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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