IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/plo/pone00/0287250.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Quantifying the economic effects of different fishery management regimes in two otherwise similar fisheries

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher Liese
  • Scott Crosson

Abstract

In the southeast U.S., two very similar fisheries are managed by very different management regimes. In the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish fishery, all major species are managed by individual transferable quotas (ITQs). The neighboring S. Atlantic Snapper-Grouper fishery continues to be managed by traditional regulations such as vessel trip-limits and closed seasons. Using detailed landings and revenue data from logbooks together with trip-level and annual, vessel-level economic survey data, we develop financial statements for each fishery to estimate cost structures, profits, and resource rent. By comparing the two fisheries from an economic perspective, we illustrate the detrimental effects of the regulatory measures on the S. Atlantic Snapper-Grouper fishery and quantify the difference in economic outcomes, including estimating the difference in resource rent. We find that the choice of fishery management regime shows up as a regime shift in the productivity and profitability of the fisheries. The ITQ fishery generates substantially more resource rents than the traditionally managed fishery; the difference is a large fraction of revenue (~30%). In the S. Atlantic Snapper-Grouper fishery, the potential value of the resource has almost completely dissipated via lower ex-vessel prices and hundreds of thousands of gallons of wasted fuel. Excess use of labor is a lesser issue.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Liese & Scott Crosson, 2023. "Quantifying the economic effects of different fishery management regimes in two otherwise similar fisheries," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(6), pages 1-19, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0287250
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0287250
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0287250
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0287250&type=printable
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1371/journal.pone.0287250?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Porter, Read D. & Jylkka, Zachary & Swanson, Greta, 2013. "Enforcement and compliance trends under IFQ management in the Gulf of Mexico commercial reef fish fishery," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 45-53.
    2. Carothers, Courtney, 2015. "Fisheries privatization, social transitions, and well-being in Kodiak, Alaska," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 313-322.
    3. Lily Hsueh, 2017. "Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the “Rights to Fish”: The Effects of Catch Shares on Fishermen’s Days at Sea," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(2), pages 407-445.
    4. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 9, pages 178-203, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. Tracy Yandle & Scott Crosson, 2015. "Whatever Happened to the Wreckfish Fishery? An Evaluation of the Oldest Finfish ITQ Program in the United States," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 193-217.
    6. Sami Dakhlia & Akbar Marvasti, 2020. "Regulatory Change, Market Structure, and Fatalities: The Case of the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fishery," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(1), pages 1-26, August.
    7. Stefan B. Gunnlaugsson & Hörður Saevaldsson & Dadi M. Kristofersson & Sveinn Agnarsson, 2020. "Resource Rent and its Distribution in Iceland’s Fisheries," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 113-135.
    8. Holland, Daniel S. & Thunberg, Eric & Agar, Juan & Crosson, Scott & Demarest, Chad & Kasperski, Stephen & Perruso, Larry & Steiner, Erin & Stephen, Jessica & Strelcheck, Andy & Travis, Mike, 2015. "US catch share markets: a review of data availability and impediments to transparent markets," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 103-110.
    9. Dupont, Diane P., 1990. "Rent dissipation in restricted access fisheries," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 26-44, July.
    10. Anna M. Birkenbach & David J. Kaczan & Martin D. Smith, 2017. "Catch shares slow the race to fish," Nature, Nature, vol. 544(7649), pages 223-226, April.
    11. Juan J. Agar & Jessica A. Stephen & Andy Strelcheck & Assane Diagne, 2014. "The Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper IFQ Program: The First Five Years," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 177-198.
    12. Soliman, Adam, 2014. "Using individual transferable quotas (ITQs) to achieve social policy objectives: A proposed intervention," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 76-81.
    13. Bremner, Graeme & Johnstone, Peter & Bateson, Tracy & Clarke, Philip, 2009. "Unreported bycatch in the New Zealand West Coast South Island hoki fishery," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 504-512, May.
    14. Dale Squires, 1992. "Productivity Measurement in Common Property Resource Industries: An Application to the Pacific Coast Trawl Fishery," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 221-236, Summer.
    15. Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 1997. "A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource Use," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-21, January.
    16. Ragnar Arnason & Trond Bjørndal & Daniel V Gordon & Mintewab Bezabih, 2018. "Measuring Potential Rents in the North Sea Herring Fishery," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 100(3), pages 889-905.
    17. Pinkerton, Evelyn & Edwards, Danielle N., 2009. "The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 707-713, July.
    18. Ragnar Arnason, 1990. "Minimum Information Management in Fisheries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 630-653, August.
    19. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 124-124.
    20. Joshua K. Abbott & Alan C. Haynie & Matthew N. Reimer, 2015. "Hidden Flexibility: Institutions, Incentives, and the Margins of Selectivity in Fishing," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 91(1), pages 169-195.
    21. Squires, Dale & Campbell, Harry & Cunningham, Stephen & Dewees, Christopher & Grafton, R Quentin & Herrick, Samuel F & Kirkley, James & Pascoe, Sean & Salvanes, Kjell & Shallard, Bruce & Turris, Bruce, 1998. "Individual transferable quotas in multispecies fisheries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 135-159, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Banzhaf, H. Spencer & Liu, Yaqin & Smith, Martin D. & Asche, Frank, 2024. "Non-parametric tests of behavior in the commons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 521-536.
    2. Catherine J. Morrison Paul & Ronald G. Felthoven & Marcelo de O. Torres, 2010. "Productive performance in fisheries: modeling, measurement, and management," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(3), pages 343-360, July.
    3. Berck, Peter & Costello, Christopher, 2000. "Overharvesting the traditional fishery with a captured regulator," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt94t2p8qq, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    4. Akihito Asano & Kelly Neill & Satoshi Yamazaki, 2016. "Decomposing Fishing Effort: Modelling The Sources Of Inefficiency In A Limited-Entry Fishery," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 16-23, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
    5. Gabriel Natividad, 2016. "Quotas, Productivity, and Prices: The Case of Anchovy Fishing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 220-257, March.
    6. repec:ags:aaea22:335749 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Holzer, Jorge & McConnell, Kenneth, 2023. "Extraction rights allocation with liquidity constraints," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    8. Berck, Peter & Costello, Christopher, 2000. "Overharvesting the traditional fishery with a captured regulator," CUDARE Working Papers 43915, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    9. Newell, Richard G. & Sanchirico, James N. & Kerr, Suzi, 2005. "Fishing quota markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 437-462, May.
    10. Pinkerton, Evelyn & Davis, Reade, 2015. "Neoliberalism and the politics of enclosure in North American small-scale fisheries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 303-312.
    11. Ben White, 2000. "A Review of the Economics of Biological Natural Resources," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 419-462, September.
    12. Lone Grønbæk, 2000. "Fishery Economics and Game Theory," Working Papers 14/00, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    13. Liu, Jing & Qin, Tianbao, 2018. "A Comparative Analysis of Fishing Rights From a Transaction Cost Perspective," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 89-99.
    14. Péreau, J.-C. & Doyen, L. & Little, L.R. & Thébaud, O., 2012. "The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological, economic and social goals with individual transferable quotas," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 419-434.
    15. Byrne, Conor & Oostdijk, Maartje & Agnarsson, Sveinn & Davidsdottir, Brynhildur, 2024. "The Transitional Gains Trap in Grandfathered Individual Transferable Quota Fisheries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    16. Strydom, M.B. & Nieuwoudt, W. Lieb, 1998. "An Economic Analysis Of Restructuring The South African Hake Quota Market," Agrekon, Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA), vol. 37(3), pages 1-15, September.
    17. Holm, Petter & Raakjær, Jesper & Becker Jacobsen, Rikke & Henriksen, Edgar, 2015. "Contesting the social contracts underpinning fisheries—Lessons from Norway, Iceland and Greenland," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 64-72.
    18. Tarui, Nori & Mason, Charles F. & Polasky, Stephen & Ellis, Greg, 2008. "Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 37-51, January.
    19. Lan Ho, 2015. "My boat my identity: Investment in tuna fishing in Viet Nam," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 40(3), pages 562-583, August.
    20. Arnason, Ragnar, 2009. "Fisheries management and operations research," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 193(3), pages 741-751, March.
    21. Gardner Brown, 2000. "Renewable Natural Resource Management and Use Without Markets," Working Papers 0025, University of Washington, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0287250. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: plosone (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.