Minimum Information Management in Fisheries
This paper deals with problems of optimal management of common-property fisheries. It advances the proposition that many fisheries management schemes, which are theoretically capable of generating efficiency, are actually not practicable, owing to their huge informational requirements. This applies, for instance, to management by means of corrective taxes/subsidies. The paper proceeds to show that there exists, under fairly unrestrictive conditions, market-based management systems that require minimal information for their operation, but lead nevertheless to efficiency in common-property fisheries. One such system is the individual transferable share quota system.
Volume (Year): 23 (1990)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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