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Decomposing Fishing Effort: Modelling The Sources Of Inefficiency In A Limited-Entry Fishery

Author

Listed:
  • Akihito Asano

    (Sophia University, Tokyo)

  • Kelly Neill

    (Economics Programme, University of Western Australia)

  • Satoshi Yamazaki

    (University of Tasmania)

Abstract

We introduce a modified version of the Gordon-Schaefer (GS) fishery model that neatly describes different sources of inefficiency in limited entry fisheries. In our modified model, each vessel chooses the number of fishing days as well as the rest of the inputs, where the choice of the latter determines its catchability coefficient. Consequently, our model explicitly isolates two sources of fishery inefficiency: (i) excess vessel days (vessels operate for more than the optimal number of days); and (ii) capital stuffing (vessels spend more than optimal on increasing their catchability coefficient). Our model predicts that when vessels cannot choose the number of fishing days as they like, both of the two sources of inefficiency become relevant in assessing the policy effects. We find that, in fisheries with fish stocks below maximum-sustainable-yield levels, introducing restrictions on fishing days or day-based access fees can increase harvest, fish stocks and total rents.

Suggested Citation

  • Akihito Asano & Kelly Neill & Satoshi Yamazaki, 2016. "Decomposing Fishing Effort: Modelling The Sources Of Inefficiency In A Limited-Entry Fishery," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 16-23, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:uwa:wpaper:16-23
    Note: MD5 = 1626a2ae75b420938f82d88a4a515d64
    as

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    File URL: https://ecompapers.biz.uwa.edu.au/paper/PDF%20of%20Discussion%20Papers/2016/DP%2016.23_Asano%20et%20al..pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fishery management; overfishing; capital-stuffing; limited entry; catchability coefficient; Gordon-Schaefer model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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