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Rights-based management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean tuna fishery: Economic and environmental change under the Vessel Day Scheme

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  • Havice, Elizabeth

Abstract

Defining, strengthening and enforcing rights over fisheries resources is frequently identified as central to overcoming ‘the tragedy of the commons’ and associated environmental and economic challenges in fisheries systems. Though economic theory generally suggests that output control (e.g. quotas) creates the strongest incentives for efficiency and conservation, input controls (e.g. on effort) remain common. This paper explores the rationale for, and implications of, employing a transferable effort scheme in one of the largest and most valuable fisheries. In 2007, eight Pacific Island countries implemented the Vessel Day Scheme with the aims of strengthening their rights over tuna resources and control over economic and environmental trends. Four years since implementation, the scheme has significantly increased economic returns for the island states and generated improvements in data reporting. However, it has not generated a firm limit on fishing effort and its structure has made it difficult to directly target the biological concerns of individual species within the multi-species fishery. In the future, outcomes of the Vessel Day Scheme will continue to be tempered by the structural limitations of effort-based regulatory scheme, market conditions in the sector and the willingness of firms and island states to clarify, abide by and enforce the technical components of the scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • Havice, Elizabeth, 2013. "Rights-based management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean tuna fishery: Economic and environmental change under the Vessel Day Scheme," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 259-267.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:42:y:2013:i:c:p:259-267
    DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2013.03.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Rao, Akhil & Burgess, Matthew & Kaffine, Daniel, 2020. "Orbital-use fees could more than quadruple the value of the space industry," MPRA Paper 112708, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Akihito Asano & Kelly Neill & Satoshi Yamazaki, 2016. "Decomposing Fishing Effort: Modelling The Sources Of Inefficiency In A Limited-Entry Fishery," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 16-23, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
    3. World Bank & Nicholas Institute, 2016. "Tuna Fisheries," World Bank Publications - Reports 28412, The World Bank Group.
    4. Bell, Johann D. & Allain, Valerie & Allison, Edward H. & Andréfouët, Serge & Andrew, Neil L. & Batty, Michael J. & Blanc, Michel & Dambacher, Jeffrey M. & Hampton, John & Hanich, Quentin & Harley, She, 2015. "Diversifying the use of tuna to improve food security and public health in Pacific Island countries and territories," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 584-591.
    5. Drupp, Moritz A. & Baumgärtner, Stefan & Meyer, Moritz & Quaas, Martin F. & von Wehrden, Henrik, 2020. "Between Ostrom and Nordhaus: The research landscape of sustainability economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    6. World Bank, 2014. "Well-being from Work in the Pacific Island Countries," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 18642, April.
    7. Yeeting, Agnes D. & Bush, Simon R. & Ram-Bidesi, Vina & Bailey, Megan, 2016. "Implications of new economic policy instruments for tuna management in the Western and Central Pacific," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 45-52.
    8. Dale Squires & Niels Vestergaard, 2016. "Putting Economics into Maximum Economic Yield," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 101-116.
    9. World Bank, 2017. "Pacific Possible," World Bank Publications - Reports 28135, The World Bank Group.

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