IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/enreec/v70y2018i2d10.1007_s10640-017-0122-y.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Windows of Opportunity for Sustainable Fisheries Management: The Case of Eastern Baltic Cod

Author

Listed:
  • Martin F. Quaas

    () (Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel)

  • Max T. Stoeven

    (Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel)

  • Bernd Klauer

    (Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research - UFZ)

  • Thomas Petersen

    (Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research - UFZ)

  • Johannes Schiller

    (Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research - UFZ)

Abstract

We study under which conditions a ‘window of opportunity’ for a change from an overfishing situation, with high fishing effort, but low stocks and catches, towards sustainable fishery management arises. Studying the Eastern Baltic cod fishery we show that at very low stock sizes (as they prevailed in the early 2000s) all interest groups involved in the fishery unanimously prefer maximum-sustainable-yield management (as prescribed by the management plan in place since 2007) over the previous overfishing situation. With increasing stock sizes, the present value of fishermen surplus would be higher when switching back to overfishing again, while other interest groups maintain their preference for sustainable fishery management.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin F. Quaas & Max T. Stoeven & Bernd Klauer & Thomas Petersen & Johannes Schiller, 2018. "Windows of Opportunity for Sustainable Fisheries Management: The Case of Eastern Baltic Cod," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(2), pages 323-341, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:70:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-017-0122-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-017-0122-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10640-017-0122-y
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Karpoff, Jonathan M, 1987. "Suboptimal Controls in Common Resource Management: The Case of the Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(1), pages 179-194, February.
    2. Baland, Jean-Marie & Bjorvatn, Kjetil, 2013. "Conservation and employment creation: can privatizing natural resources benefit traditional users?," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(3), pages 309-325, June.
    3. Steffen Andersen & Glenn W. Harrison & Morten I. Lau & E. Elisabet Rutström, 2008. "Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 583-618, May.
    4. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-1022, December.
    5. Péreau, J.-C. & Doyen, L. & Little, L.R. & Thébaud, O., 2012. "The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological, economic and social goals with individual transferable quotas," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 419-434.
    6. Corbett A. Grainger & Christopher Costello, 2016. "Distributional Effects of the Transition to Property Rights for a Common-Pool Resource," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 1-26.
    7. Nielsen, Max, 2006. "Trade liberalisation, resource sustainability and welfare: The case of East Baltic cod," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 650-664, June.
    8. Quaas, Martin F. & Froese, Rainer & Herwartz, Helmut & Requate, Till & Schmidt, Jörn O. & Voss, Rüdiger, 2012. "Fishing industry borrows from natural capital at high shadow interest rates," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 45-52.
    9. Copes, Parzival, 1972. "Factor Rents, Sole Ownership and the Optimum Level of Fisheries Exploitation," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 40(2), pages 145-163, June.
    10. Pedro Pintassilgo & Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2015. "International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 689-709, December.
    11. Christopher Costello & Corbett A. Grainger, 2018. "Property Rights, Regulatory Capture, and Exploitation of Natural Resources," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(2), pages 441-479.
    12. Emmi Nieminen & Lone Grønbæk Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2016. "International Agreements in the Multispecies Baltic Sea Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 109-134, September.
    13. Ute Kapaun & Martin Quaas, 2013. "Does the Optimal Size of a Fish Stock Increase with Environmental Uncertainties?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 54(2), pages 293-310, February.
    14. Julia Hoffmann & Martin Quaas, 2016. "Common Pool Politics and Inefficient Fishery Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(1), pages 79-93, January.
    15. Faber, Malte & Frank, Karin & Klauer, Bernd & Manstetten, Reiner & Schiller, Johannes & Wissel, Christian, 2005. "On the foundation of a general theory of stocks," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 155-172, November.
    16. Paul A. Samuelson, 1974. "Is the Rent-Collector Worthy of His Full Hire?," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 7-10, January.
    17. Weitzman, Martin L., 1974. "Free access vs private ownership as alternative systems for managing common property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 225-234, June.
    18. Olli Tahvonen & Martin Quaas & Jörn Schmidt & Rudi Voss, 2013. "Optimal Harvesting of an Age-Structured Schooling Fishery," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 54(1), pages 21-39, January.
    19. Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 1997. "A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource Use," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-21, January.
    20. Tahvonen, Olli, 2009. "Economics of harvesting age-structured fish populations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 281-299, November.
    21. Clark, Colin W & Clarke, Frank H & Munro, Gordon R, 1979. "The Optimal Exploitation of Renewable Resource Stocks: Problems of Irreversible Investment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 25-47, January.
    22. Corbett A. Grainger & Dominic P. Parker, 2013. "The Political Economy of Fishery Reform," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 369-386, June.
    23. Wilen, James E., 2000. "Renewable Resource Economists and Policy: What Differences Have We Made?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 306-327, May.
    24. Boyce, John R., 2004. "Instrument choice in a fishery," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 183-206, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andries Richter & Anne Maria Eikeset & Daan Soest & Florian Klaus Diekert & Nils Chr. Stenseth, 2018. "Optimal Management Under Institutional Constraints: Determining a Total Allowable Catch for Different Fleet Segments in the Northeast Arctic Cod Fishery," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 69(4), pages 811-835, April.
    2. Boyce, John R., 2004. "Instrument choice in a fishery," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 183-206, January.
    3. Christopher Costello & Corbett A. Grainger, 2018. "Property Rights, Regulatory Capture, and Exploitation of Natural Resources," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(2), pages 441-479.
    4. Berck, Peter & Costello, Christopher, 2000. "Overharvesting the traditional fishery with a captured regulator," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt94t2p8qq, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    5. Berck, Peter & Costello, Christopher, 2000. "Overharvesting the traditional fishery with a captured regulator," CUDARE Working Papers 43915, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    6. Matthew N. Reimer & Joshua K. Abbott & James E. Wilen, 2014. "Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(3), pages 538-559.
    7. Tahvonen, Olli & Quaas, Martin F. & Voss, Rüdiger, 2018. "Harvesting selectivity and stochastic recruitment in economic models of age-structured fisheries," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 659-676.
    8. Eggert, Håkan, 2006. "Fisheries Economics and 20 years with Marine Resource Economics: A Citation Analysis," Working Papers in Economics 203, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    9. Smith, Martin D. & Zhang, Junjie & Coleman, Felicia C., 2008. "Econometric modeling of fisheries with complex life histories: Avoiding biological management failures," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 265-280, May.
    10. Akihito Asano & Kelly Neill & Satoshi Yamazaki, 2016. "Decomposing Fishing Effort: Modelling The Sources Of Inefficiency In A Limited-Entry Fishery," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 16-23, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
    11. Costello, Christopher & Quérou, Nicolas & Tomini, Agnes, 2015. "Partial enclosure of the commons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 69-78.
    12. Jules Selles, 2018. "Fisheries management: what uncertainties matter?," Working Papers hal-01824238, HAL.
    13. Christine Bertram & Martin F. Quaas, 2017. "Biodiversity and Optimal Multi-species Ecosystem Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(2), pages 321-350, June.
    14. Flaaten, Ola & Schulz, Carl Erik, 2010. "Triple win for trade in renewable resource goods by use of export taxes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(5), pages 1076-1082, March.
    15. Quaas, Martin F. & Requate, Till & Ruckes, Kirsten & Skonhoft, Anders & Vestergaard, Niels & Voss, Rudi, 2013. "Incentives for optimal management of age-structured fish populations," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 113-134.
    16. Dale T. Manning & J. Edward Taylor & James E. Wilen, 2018. "General Equilibrium Tragedy of the Commons," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 69(1), pages 75-101, January.
    17. Julia Hoffmann & Martin Quaas, 2016. "Common Pool Politics and Inefficient Fishery Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(1), pages 79-93, January.
    18. Isaksen, Elisabeth Thuestad & Richter, Andries, 2019. "Tragedy, property rights, and the commons: investigating the causal relationship from institutions to ecosystem collapse," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90606, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    19. Heaps, Terry, 2003. "The effects on welfare of the imposition of individual transferable quotas on a heterogeneous fishing fleet," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 557-576, November.
    20. Stoeven, Max T. & Quaas, Martin F., 2012. "Privatizing renewable resources: Who gains, who loses?," Economics Working Papers 2012-02, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sustainable resource use; Fisheries economics; Resource rent; Consumer surplus; Worker surplus;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:70:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-017-0122-y. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.