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Partial enclosure of the commons

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher Costello

    (Bren School of Environmental Science and Managemen)

  • Nicolas Querou

    () (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UM3 - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - INRA Montpellier - Institut national de la recherche agronomique [Montpellier] - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Agnès Tomini

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales)

Abstract

We examine the efficiency, distributional, and environmental consequences of assigning spatial property rights to part of a spatially-connected natural resource while the remainder is competed for by an open access fringe. We refer to this as partial enclosure of the commons. We obtain sharp analytical results regarding partial enclosure of the commons including: (1) While second best, it typically improves welfare relative to no property rights, (2) all resource users can be made better off, (3) positive rents arise in the open access area, and (4) the resource maintains higher stocks. Under spatial heterogeneity, we also characterize spatial regions that are ideal candidates for partial enclosure - typically, society should seek to enclose those patches with high environmental productivity and high self-retention, but whether high economic productivity promotes or relegates a patch may depend on one's objective.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Costello & Nicolas Querou & Agnès Tomini, 2015. "Partial enclosure of the commons," Post-Print hal-01132260, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01132260
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01132260
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Fabbri, G. & Faggian, S. & Freni, G., 2018. "Spatial resource wars: A two region example," Working Papers 2018-04, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    2. repec:kap:enreec:v:70:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-017-0125-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Alexandre CROUTZET & Pierre LASSERRE, 2016. "Optimal Completeness of Property Rights on Renewable Resources in Presence of Market Power," Cahiers de recherche 10-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    4. Christopher Costello & Bruno Nkuiya & Nicolas Querou, 2017. "Extracting spatial resources under possible regime shift," Working Papers hal-01615939, HAL.
    5. N. Quérou & A. Tomini, 2018. "Marine Ecosystem Considerations and Second-Best Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(2), pages 381-401, June.
    6. Christopher Costello & Nicolas Querou & Agnès Tomini, 2014. "Spatial concessions with limited tenure," Post-Print hal-01123392, HAL.
    7. Hughes, Jonathan E. & Kaffine, Daniel, 2017. "When is increasing consumption of common property optimal? Sorting, congestion and entry in the commons," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 227-242.
    8. repec:eee:resene:v:49:y:2017:i:c:p:16-32 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:kap:enreec:v:71:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10640-017-0138-3 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    natural resources; common property; incomplete property rights;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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