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International Agreements in the Multispecies Baltic Sea Fisheries

Author

Listed:
  • Emmi Nieminen

    () (University of Helsinki)

  • Lone Grønbæk Kronbak

    (University of Southern Denmark)

  • Marko Lindroos

    (University of Helsinki)

Abstract

Abstract This study analyses a multispecies (cod, herring and sprat) partition function game among three asymmetric countries in the Baltic Sea. Through an empirical application, the study highlights the importance of dynamic multispecies models in coalition formation. We show that the grand coalition between the three countries can be stabilised when the most efficient country compensates the other countries. This solution is not feasible when using a single-species model for the cod population; thus, taking into account the multispecies nature of the Baltic Sea fisheries, the scope of cooperation increases compared with a single-species simulation. In contrast to the predominant conception, climate change may improve the likelihood of a binding agreement because with a lower cod biomass, countries will gain more from cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Emmi Nieminen & Lone Grønbæk Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2016. "International Agreements in the Multispecies Baltic Sea Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 109-134, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:65:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s10640-015-9933-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-015-9933-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2016. "Game Theory and Environmental and Resource Economics—In Honour of Alfred Endres, Part Two," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 1-4, September.
    2. repec:kap:enreec:v:70:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-017-0122-y is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:eee:ecomod:v:377:y:2018:i:c:p:51-65 is not listed on IDEAS

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