Externalities, Market Power, and Resource Extraction
This paper analyzes the effect of market power in a model with dynamic and biological externalities. When several countries harvest fish in international waters the evolution of fish population is affected by their joint action, thus, generating a biological and a dynamic externality. If there is trade in fish, the market-clearing prices depend on the harvesting and consumption decision made in every country. Therefore, market-clearing prices generate another type of interdependence. The planners' make their policy decision by taking account of various externalities.We find a subgame perfect Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the conditions under which it may be efficient. We also study the role of di®erent externalities in generating inefficiency.
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- Datta, Manjira & Mirman, Leonard J, 2000.
"Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination,"
Review of International Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 44-59, February.
- Manjira Datta & Leonard J. Mirman, "undated". "Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination," Working Papers 97/11, Arizona State University, Department of Economics.
- Manjira Datta & Leonard Mirman, "undated". "Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination," Working Papers 2132841, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
- Datta, Manjira, 1997. "Externalities and Price Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(3), pages 587-603, August.
- Manjira Datta, "undated". "Externalities and Price Dynamics," Working Papers 9710, Arizona State University, Department of Economics.
- DATTA, Manjira, 1994. "Externalities and Price Dynamics," CORE Discussion Papers 1994006, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Brander, James A. & Scott Taylor, M., 1998. "Open access renewable resources: Trade and trade policy in a two-country model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 181-209, April.
- James A. Brander & M. Scott Taylor, 1996. "Open Access Renewable Resources: Trade and Trade Policy in a Two-CountryModel," NBER Working Papers 5474, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1992. "Strategic dynamic interaction : Fish wars," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 267-287, April.
- Karp, Larry, 1992. "Social Welfare in a Common Property Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(2), pages 353-372, May.
- Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1996. "The Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-42, January.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F & Stokey, Nancy L, 1985. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 161-173, February.
- Copeland, Brian R., 1990. "Strategic enhancement and destruction of fisheries and the environment in the presence of international externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 213-226, November.
- H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124-124. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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