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Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form

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  • Do, Kim Hang Pham
  • Folmer, Henk

Abstract

This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achieve effective control of a high seas fishery in the context of partial cooperation. We analyse the feasible allocations of property rights among members of a given RFMO and coalitions of potential entrants. We demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from both partial and full cooperations.

Suggested Citation

  • Do, Kim Hang Pham & Folmer, Henk, 2004. "Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form," 2004 Conference, June 25-26, 2004, Blenheim, New Zealand 97792, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:nzar04:97792
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.97792
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kim Hang Pham Do & Henk Norde, 2007. "The Shapley Value For Partition Function Form Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 353-360.
    2. Pham Do, K.H. & Folmer, H. & Norde, H.W., 2001. "Transboundary Fishery Management : A Game Theoretic Approach," Other publications TiSEM 70d5ae5d-ec01-4353-a444-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Kroeze-Gil, J., 2003. "International Environmental Problems, Issue Linkage and the European Union," Other publications TiSEM 8763c9c4-fda8-444a-950c-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Datta, Manjira & Mirman, Leonard J., 1999. "Externalities, Market Power, and Resource Extraction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 233-255, May.
    5. Trond Bjørndal & Veijo Kaitala & Marko Lindroos & Gordon Munro, 2000. "The management of high seas fisheries," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 183-196, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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