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Close the High Seas to Fishing?

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  • Crow White
  • Christopher Costello

Abstract

: Closing the high seas to fishing could induce cooperation among countries and lead to global increases in fish stocks, harvest, and profit. The world's oceans are governed as a system of over 150 sovereign exclusive economic zones (EEZs, ∼42% of the ocean) and one large high seas (HS) commons (∼58% of ocean) with essentially open access. Many high-valued fish species such as tuna, billfish, and shark migrate around these large oceanic regions, which as a consequence of competition across EEZs and a global race-to-fish on the HS, have been over-exploited and now return far less than their economic potential. We address this global challenge by analyzing with a spatial bioeconomic model the effects of completely closing the HS to fishing. This policy both induces cooperation among countries in the exploitation of migratory stocks and provides a refuge sufficiently large to recover and maintain these stocks at levels close to those that would maximize fisheries returns. We find that completely closing the HS to fishing would simultaneously give rise to large gains in fisheries profit (>100%), fisheries yields (>30%), and fish stock conservation (>150%). We also find that changing EEZ size may benefit some fisheries; nonetheless, a complete closure of the HS still returns larger fishery and conservation outcomes than does a HS open to fishing.

Suggested Citation

  • Crow White & Christopher Costello, 2014. "Close the High Seas to Fishing?," PLOS Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(3), pages 1-5, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pbio00:1001826
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.1001826
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    Cited by:

    1. Quérou, Nicolas & Tomini, Agnes & Costello, Christopher, 2022. "Limited‐tenure concessions for collective goods," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    2. Louise Teh & Vicky Lam & William Cheung & Dana Miller & Lydia Teh & U. Rashid Sumaila, 2017. "Impact of high seas closure on food security in low-income fish-dependent countries," Chapters, in: Paulo A.L.D. Nunes & Lisa E. Svensson & Anil Markandya (ed.), Handbook on the Economics and Management of Sustainable Oceans, chapter 11, pages 232-262, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Christopher Costello & Bruno Nkuiya & Nicolas Querou, 2017. "Extracting spatial resources under possible regime shift," Working Papers hal-01615939, HAL.
    4. Costello, Christopher & Molina, Renato, 2021. "Transboundary marine protected areas," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    5. Christopher Costello & Nicolas Querou & Agnès Tomini, 2014. "Spatial concessions with limited tenure," Post-Print hal-01123392, HAL.
    6. Hannah, Lee & Costello, Christopher & Elliot, Vittoria & Owashi, Brandon & Nam, So & Oyanedel, Rodrigo & Chea, Ratha & Vibol, Ouk & Phen, Chheng & McDonald, Gavin, 2019. "Designing freshwater protected areas (FPAs) for indiscriminate fisheries," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 393(C), pages 127-134.
    7. Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2019. "The Role of Social and Technical Excludability for the Success of Impure Public Good and Common Pool Agreements: The Case of International Fisheries," Graz Economics Papers 2019-12, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    8. Finus, Michael & Schneider, Raoul & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2020. "The role of social and technical excludability for the success of impure public good and common pool agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    9. Takashina, Nao & Lee, Joung-Hun & Possingham, Hugh P., 2017. "Effect of marine reserve establishment on non-cooperative fisheries management," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 360(C), pages 336-342.
    10. Wright, Glen & Ardron, Jeff & Gjerde, Kristina & Currie, Duncan & Rochette, Julien, 2015. "Advancing marine biodiversity protection through regional fisheries management: A review of bottom fisheries closures in areas beyond national jurisdiction," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 134-148.

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