Can issue linkage help mitigate externalities and enhance cooperation
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsgames with externalities; convexity; s-core; transboundary rivers; issue linkage; international water sharing agreement;
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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