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The importance of structure in linking games

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  • Just, Richard E.
  • Netanyahu, Sinaia

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  • Just, Richard E. & Netanyahu, Sinaia, 2000. "The importance of structure in linking games," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:agecon:v:24:y:2000:i:1:p:87-100
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grant Hauer & C. Ford Runge, 1999. "Trade‐Environment Linkages in the Resolution of Transboundary Externalities," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 25-39, January.
    2. Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
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    1. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues," Working Papers 2005.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Erik Ansink & Arjan Ruijs, 2008. "Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 249-266, October.
    3. von Mouche, Pierre & Folmer, Henk, 2007. "Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?," Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers 9557, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    4. Ert, Eyal & Cohen-Amin, Shier & Dinar, Ariel, 2019. "The effect of issue linkage on cooperation in bilateral conflicts: An experimental analysis," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 134-142.
    5. Pham Do, Kim Hang & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2011. "Can issue linkage help mitigate externalities and enhance cooperation," MPRA Paper 37408, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Bhaduri, Anik & Perez, Nicostrato D. & Liebe, Jens, "undated". "Scope and Sustainability of Cooperation in Transboundary Water Sharing of the Volta River," Discussion Papers 43324, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
    7. Kimmich, Christian & Sagebiel, Julian, 2016. "Empowering irrigation: A game-theoretic approach to electricity utilization in Indian agriculture," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(PB), pages 174-185.
    8. Marianna Khachaturyan & Karina Schoengold, 2019. "Applying Interconnected Game Theory to Analyze Transboundary Waters: A Case Study of the Kura–Araks Basin," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 1-32, January.

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