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Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues

Author

Listed:
  • Carlo Carraro

    (University of Venice)

  • Carmen Marchiori

    (London School of Economics and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei)

  • Alessandra Sgobbi

    (SSAV and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei)

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water related issues – which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that to, on the one hand, identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and their characteristics; and, on the other hand, to support policy makers in devising the “rules of the game” that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially of trans-boundary nature, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, this paper first discusses the non-cooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Particular attention will be given to those directly modelling the process of negotiation, although some attempts at finding strategies to maintain the efficient allocation solution will also be illustrated. In addition, this paper will focus on Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), developed to support the process of negotiation. This field of research is still relatively new, however, and NSS have not yet found much use in real life negotiation. The paper will conclude by highlighting the key remaining gaps in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues," Working Papers 2005.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.65
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Grundel, S. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2011. "A Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games : Multipurpose Resource Allocation," Discussion Paper 2011-029, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Ambec, Stefan & Ehlers, Lars, 2008. "Sharing a river among satiable agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-50, September.
    3. Janmaat, John, 2008. "Playing monopoly in the creek: Imperfect competition, development, and in-stream flows," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 455-473, August.
    4. Soesja Grundel & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2013. "Resource allocation games: a compromise stable extension of bankruptcy games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 78(2), pages 149-169, October.
    5. Carlo Carraro & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," Working Papers 2007_12, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    6. repec:spr:waterr:v:31:y:2017:i:9:d:10.1007_s11269-017-1648-z is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Dinar, Ariel & Farolfi, Stefano & Patrone, Fioravante & Rowntree, Kate, 2006. "TO NEGOTIATE OR TO GAME THEORIZE: Negotiation vs. Game Theory Outcomes for Water Allocation Problems in the Kat Basin, South Africa," Working Papers 60888, University of Pretoria, Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural Development.
    8. Zareena Begum Irfan & Jeeva Mary Jacob, 2016. "Game Theoretical Approach to Regulate the Public-Owned River Water Utilities: A case study of Cauvery River," Working Papers 2016-142, Madras School of Economics,Chennai,India.
    9. Erik Ansink & Arjan Ruijs, 2008. "Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 249-266, October.
    10. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:n:s0219198908001935 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Bhaduri, Anik & Perez, Nicostrato D. & Liebe, Jens, 2008. "Scope and Sustainability of Cooperation in Transboundary Water Sharing of the Volta River," Discussion Papers 43324, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
    12. van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2012. "Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 388-403.
    13. Christoph Jeßberger, 2011. "Multilateral Environmental Agreements up to 2050: Are They Sustainable Enough?," ifo Working Paper Series 98, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    14. Harold Houba, 2008. "Computing Alternating Offers And Water Prices In Bilateral River Basin Management," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 257-278.
    15. Harold Houba & Gerard Laan & Yuyu Zeng, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 855-872, December.
    16. Alban Thomas & Vera Zaporozhets, 2017. "Bargaining Over Environmental Budgets: A Political Economy Model with Application to French Water Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(2), pages 227-248, October.
    17. Zareena Begum Irfan & Jeeva Mary Jacob, 2016. "Game Theoretical Approach to Regulate the Public-Owned River Water Utilities: A Case Study of Cauvery River," Working Papers id:10746, eSocialSciences.
    18. Peter Egger & Christoph Jeßberger & Mario Larch, 2011. "Trade and investment liberalization as determinants of multilateral environmental agreement membership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(6), pages 605-633, December.
    19. Janmaat, Johannus A., 2007. "Stakeholder Engagement in Land Development Decisions: A Waste of Effort?," MPRA Paper 6147, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Grundel, S. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2013. "Resource Allocation Problems with Concave Reward Functions," Discussion Paper 2013-070, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    21. repec:spr:compst:v:78:y:2013:i:2:p:149-169 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Fabio Zagonari, 2010. "Sustainable, Just, Equal, and Optimal Groundwater Management Strategies to Cope with Climate Change: Insights from Brazil," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 24(13), pages 3731-3756, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Negotiation theory; Water; Agreeements; Stochasticity; Stakeholders;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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