IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v30y1996i1p97-111.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Modelling multilateral negotiations: An application to California water policy

Author

Listed:
  • Adams, Gregory
  • Rausser, Gordon
  • Simon, Leo

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Adams, Gregory & Rausser, Gordon & Simon, Leo, 1996. "Modelling multilateral negotiations: An application to California water policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 97-111, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:30:y:1996:i:1:p:97-111
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-2681(96)00844-X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, L., 1990. "Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: A Multilateral Bargaining Approach," Staff General Research Papers Archive 819, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Simon, Leo K. & Thoyer, Sophie & Morardet, Sylvie & Goodhue, Rachael E. & Rio, Patrick & Rausser, Gordon C., 2003. "Structure and bargaining power in multilateral negotiations: Application to water management policies in France," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia 58258, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    2. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues," Working Papers 2005.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Rupayan Gupta, 2010. "Structuring international institutions for the efficient provisioning of global security," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 169-197, July.
    4. repec:spr:waterr:v:31:y:2017:i:13:d:10.1007_s11269-017-1746-y is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Sgobbi, Alessandra & Carraro, Carlo, 2011. "A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 1(2), pages 119-150, April.
    6. Tyagi, Ashish & Shortle, James S., 2016. "Modeling Endogenous Change in Water Allocation Mechanisms: A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Approach," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, 2016, Boston, Massachusetts 235571, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    7. Ben Li & Guangming Tan & Gang Chen, 2016. "Generalized Uncooperative Planar Game Theory Model for Water Distribution in Transboundary Rivers," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(1), pages 225-241, January.
    8. Fabio Zagonari, 2010. "Sustainable, Just, Equal, and Optimal Groundwater Management Strategies to Cope with Climate Change: Insights from Brazil," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 24(13), pages 3731-3756, October.
    9. Soltani, Arezoo & Sankhayan, Prem Lall & Hofstad, Ole, 2016. "Playing forest governance games: State-village conflict in Iran," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 251-261.
    10. Jean-Daniel Rinaudo & Sylvie Morardet, 1999. "Acceptabilité des réformes des politiques de gestion de l'eau [Cadre d'analyse et exemples]," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 254(1), pages 36-44.
    11. Erik Ansink & Harold Houba, 2014. "The Economics of Transboundary River Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-132/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    12. Janmaat, John, 2008. "Playing monopoly in the creek: Imperfect competition, development, and in-stream flows," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 455-473, August.
    13. Carraro, Carlo & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 6424, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Janmaat, Johannus A., 2007. "Stakeholder Engagement in Land Development Decisions: A Waste of Effort?," MPRA Paper 6147, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Ben Li & Guangming Tan & Gang Chen, 2016. "Generalized Uncooperative Planar Game Theory Model for Water Distribution in Transboundary Rivers," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(1), pages 225-241, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:30:y:1996:i:1:p:97-111. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.