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Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: Multi-Lateral Bargaining Approach, A

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  • Gordon C. Rausser
  • Leo K. Simon

Abstract

This paper proposes a noncooperative model of multilateral bargaining. The model can be viewed as an extension of the famous Stahl-Rubinstein bargaining game. Two players take turns proposing a division of a "pie." After one player has proposed a division, the other can accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal is accepted, the game ends and the division is adopted; if it is rejected, the second player then makes a proposal, which the first player then accepts or rejects. And so on. In Stahl's formulation, the game continues for a finite number of rounds; in Rubinstein's extension, the number of rounds is infinite. We propose a generalization of this model to incorporate multiple players and multidimensional issue spaces. We consider a sequence of games with infinite bargaining horizons, and study the limit points of the equilibrium outcomes as the horizon is extended without bound. A novel feature of our model is that the proposer is chosen randomly "by nature" in each round or bargaining, according to a prespecified vector of strictly positive "access probabilities."

Suggested Citation

  • Gordon C. Rausser & Leo K. Simon, 1992. "Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: Multi-Lateral Bargaining Approach, A," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 90-gatt22, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:ias:cpaper:90-gatt22
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon, Leo K. & Thoyer, Sophie & Morardet, Sylvie & Goodhue, Rachael E. & Rio, Patrick & Rausser, Gordon C., 2003. "Structure and bargaining power in multilateral negotiations: Application to water management policies in France," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia 58258, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    2. Tyagi, Ashish & Shortle, James S., 2016. "Modeling Endogenous Change in Water Allocation Mechanisms: A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Approach," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235571, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Carlo Carraro & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," Working Papers 2007_12, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    4. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues," Working Papers 2005.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    6. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:n:s0219198908001935 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Harold Houba, 2008. "Computing Alternating Offers And Water Prices In Bilateral River Basin Management," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 257-278.

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