Applications of negotiation theory to water issues
The authors review the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to waterrelated issues-which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. They aim to identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge and their characteristics, to support policymakers in devising the"rules of the game"that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially trans-boundary allocation, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, the authors first discuss the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Key findings include the important role noncooperative negotiations can play in cases where binding agreements cannot be signed; the value added of politically and socially acceptable compromises; and the need for a negotiated model that considers incomplete information over the negotiated resource.
|Date of creation:||01 Jun 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433|
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- D. Kilgour & Ariel Dinar, 2001. "Flexible Water Sharing within an International River Basin," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(1), pages 43-60, January.
- Crow, Ben & Singh, Nirvikar, 2000. "Impediments and Innovation in International Rivers: The Waters of South Asia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(11), pages 1907-1925, November.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
252, David K. Levine.
- Gordon C. Rausser & Leo K. Simon, 1992.
"Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: Multi-Lateral Bargaining Approach, A,"
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications
90-gatt22, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
- Gordon C. Rausser & Leo K. Simon, 1992. "Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: Multi-Lateral Bargaining Approach, A," Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) Publications 90-gatt22, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at Iowa State University.
- Simon, Leo K. & Goodhue, Rachael E. & Rausser, Gordon C. & Thoyer, Sophie & Morardet, Sylvie & Rio, Patrick, 2007. "Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy," Monographs, University of California, Davis, Giannini Foundation, number 37630.
- Adams, Gregory & Rausser, Gordon & Simon, Leo, 1996. "Modelling multilateral negotiations: An application to California water policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 97-111, July.
- Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K., 1992.
"A Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: A Multilateral Bargaining Approach,"
Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series
qt1p67k0dp, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, L., 1990. "Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: A Multilateral Bargaining Approach," Staff General Research Papers 819, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K., 1992. "A noncooperative model of collective decision making: a multilateral bargaining approach," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt8ch813x0, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Tsur, Yacov & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore, 1991. "The buffer value of groundwater with stochastic surface water supplies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 201-224, November.
- Petr Šauer & Antonín Dvořák & Aleš Lisa & Petr Fiala, 2003. "A Procedure for Negotiating Pollution Reduction under Information Asymmetry. Surface Water Quality Case," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 24(2), pages 103-119, February.
- Provencher Bill & Burt Oscar, 1993. "The Externalities Associated with the Common Property Exploitation of Groundwater," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 139-158, March.
- Roseta-Palma, Catarina, 2002. "Groundwater Management When Water Quality Is Endogenous," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 93-105, July.
- Tsur Yacov & Zemel Amos, 1995. "Uncertainty and Irreversibility in Groundwater Resource Management," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 149-161, September.
- Kilgour, D. Marc & Dinar, Ariel, 1995. "Are stable agreements for sharing international river waters now possible?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1474, The World Bank.
- Just, Richard E. & Netanyahu, Sinaia, 2000.
"The importance of structure in linking games,"
Agricultural Economics of Agricultural Economists,
International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 24(1), December.
- Booker J. F. & Young R. A., 1994. "Modeling Intrastate and Interstate Markets for Colorado River Water Resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 66-87, January.
- Sophie Thoyer & Sylvie Morardet & Patrick Rio & Leo Simon & Rachael Goodhue & Gordon Rausser, 2001. "A Bargaining Model to Simulate Negotiations Between Water Users," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 4(2), pages 6.
- Catarina Roseta-Palma & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2004. "Robust Control in Water Management," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 21-34, 07.
- Dinar, Ariel & Rosegrant, Mark W. & Meinzen-Dick, Ruth, 1997. "Water allocation mechanisms : principles and examples," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1779, The World Bank.
- Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3641. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.