Stakeholder Engagement in Land Development Decisions: A Waste of Effort?
Abstract Currently, management devolution and engagement of local stakeholders - expected to have better information - is seen as key to effective environmental management. Often, the absence of clear property rights and/or supporting market institutions leaves management decisions to a political process. Where undeveloped land provides a public good, when to halt further development is modelled as a repeated lobbying contest between industry and households. Lobbying effort affects the continuation probability. Depending on how stakeholders are engaged, there may be little impact on final outcomes, or a lobbying war can be stimulated. Overall welfare is seldom enhanced.
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