Complementarity in contests
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References listed on IDEAS
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
- Nti, Kofi O, 1997. "Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 43-59, February.
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- Linster, Bruce G, 1994. "Cooperative Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 23-34, October.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012.
"Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Magnus HOFFMANN, 2010. "Endogenous Timing in General Rent?Seeking and Conflict Models," Working Papers 201024, CERDI.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Magnus Hoffmann, 2011. "Endogenous Timing in General Rent‐Seeking and Conflict Models," Working Papers halshs-00553119, HAL.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Magnus Hoffmann, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Post-Print halshs-00689738, HAL.
- Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota Graziosi, Gregoire, 2010. "Endogenous Timing in General Rent-Seeking and Conflict Models," MPRA Paper 24084, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo Mialon, 2010. "Multi-activity contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 23-43, April.
- Jean-Pierre Tranchant, 2005. "Cooperation Breakdowns under Incomplete Property Rights," Public Economics 0506006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alex Robson, 2005. "Multi-Item Contests," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2005-446, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
More about this item
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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