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Multi-player, Multi-prize, Imperfectly Discriminating Contests

  • André De Palma

    ()

    (ENS Cachan - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan - École normale supérieure de Cachan - ENS Cachan)

  • Soumyanetra Munshi

    ()

    (IIMB - Indian Institute of Management Bangalore - Indian Institute of Management Bangalore)

This paper models success probability in imperfectly discriminating contests involving multiple players and multiple prizes. This turns out to be a generalization of Tullock's contest success function to a multiplayer, multi-prize situation. The model can be used to analyse e orts exerted by individuals in various real-life situations, like obtaining seats in congested public transportation vehicles or obtaining admission into elite educational institutes. We propose a \holistic" probability model, derive the equilibrium e orts exerted, and analyse those e orts, the associated total costs and total dissipation, and also pricing and the optimal number of 'seats'. We also discuss extensions of the model.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00683688.

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Date of creation: 29 Mar 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00683688
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  1. Mohring, Herbert, 1972. "Optimization and Scale Economies in Urban Bus Transportation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 591-604, September.
  2. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
  3. Parry, Ian W.H. & Small, Kenneth, 2007. "Should Urban Transit Subsidies Be Reduced?," Discussion Papers dp-07-38, Resources For the Future.
  4. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November.
  5. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
  6. Vickrey, William S, 1969. "Congestion Theory and Transport Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 251-60, May.
  7. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
  8. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
  9. Nti, Kofi O, 1997. "Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 43-59, February.
  10. de Palma, Andre & Picard, Nathalie & Waddell, Paul, 2007. "Discrete choice models with capacity constraints: An empirical analysis of the housing market of the greater Paris region," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 204-230, September.
  11. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2011. "Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games," MPRA Paper 32871, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-15, September.
  13. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Robert McCann & Lars Nesheim, 2007. "Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness," CeMMAP working papers CWP23/07, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  14. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  15. Blavatskyy, Pavlo R., 2010. "Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 267-276, March.
  16. Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
  17. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March.
  18. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
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