Multi-player, Multi-prize, Imperfectly Discriminating Contests
This paper models success probability in imperfectly discriminating contests involving multiple players and multiple prizes. This turns out to be a generalization of Tullock's contest success function to a multiplayer, multi-prize situation. The model can be used to analyse e orts exerted by individuals in various real-life situations, like obtaining seats in congested public transportation vehicles or obtaining admission into elite educational institutes. We propose a \holistic" probability model, derive the equilibrium e orts exerted, and analyse those e orts, the associated total costs and total dissipation, and also pricing and the optimal number of 'seats'. We also discuss extensions of the model.
|Date of creation:||29 Mar 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00683688|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
- Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999.
"The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
99-75, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March.
- Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Robert McCann & Lars Nesheim, 2007.
"Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness,"
CeMMAP working papers
CWP23/07, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Pierre-André Chiappori & Robert McCann & Lars Nesheim, 2010. "Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 317-354, February.
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
- Ian W. H. Parry & Kenneth A. Small, 2009.
"Should Urban Transit Subsidies Be Reduced?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 700-724, June.
- Parry, Ian W.H. & Small, Kenneth, 2007. "Should Urban Transit Subsidies Be Reduced?," Discussion Papers dp-07-38, Resources For the Future.
- Ian W.H. Parry & Kenneth A. Small, 2007. "Should Urban Transit Subsidies Be Reduced?," Working Papers 060723, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Vickrey, William S, 1969. "Congestion Theory and Transport Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 251-60, May.
- Sherwin Rosen, 1985.
"Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments,"
NBER Working Papers
1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996.
"Contest success functions (*),"
Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
- de Palma, Andre & Picard, Nathalie & Waddell, Paul, 2007.
"Discrete choice models with capacity constraints: An empirical analysis of the housing market of the greater Paris region,"
Journal of Urban Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 204-230, September.
- André de Palma & Nathalie Picard & Paul Waddell, 2007. "Discrete choice models with capacity constraints: an empirical analysis of the housing market of the greater Paris region," THEMA Working Papers 2007-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987.
"Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
452, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Nti, Kofi O, 1997. "Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 43-59, February.
- Blavatskyy, Pavlo R., 2010. "Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 267-276, March.
- Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2011. "Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games," MPRA Paper 32871, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mohring, Herbert, 1972. "Optimization and Scale Economies in Urban Bus Transportation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 591-604, September.
- Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00683688. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.