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The Basic Economics of Match Fixing in Sport Tournaments

Author

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  • Raul Caruso

    (Institute of Economic Policy, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano, 20123 Milano, Italy)

Abstract

Match-fixing is a recurring phenomenon of sport contests. This paper presents a simple formal model in order to explain them. The intuition behind is that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is the key factor leading to match-fixing or to tacit collusion. In particular, it will be demonstrated that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake can lead to a concession from one agent to the other and then to a match-fixing. It is also demonstrated that when the asymmetry in the evaluation is extremely large there is room for tacit collusion. Eventually the intuitions and results of the model will be applied to make a comparison between the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Champions League tournaments.

Suggested Citation

  • Raul Caruso, 2009. "The Basic Economics of Match Fixing in Sport Tournaments," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 355-377, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v39:y:2009:i:3:p:355-377
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    Cited by:

    1. Helmut Dietl & Christian Weingärtner, 2012. "Betting scandals and attenuated property rights - How betting related match fixing can be prevented in future," Working Papers 0154, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    2. Marco Di Domizio & Raul Caruso, 2015. "Hooliganism and Demand for Football in Italy: Attendance and Counterviolence Policy Evaluation," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 16(2), pages 123-137, May.
    3. Waldemar Stronka, 2020. "Anti-Tanking Pair Matching before an Elimination Phase of a Two-Phase Tournament," Economies, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-13, August.
    4. Alessandro Baroncelli & Raul Caruso, 2011. "The Organization And Economics Of Italian Serie A: A Brief Overall View," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 7(2), pages 67-85, September.
    5. Michael Jetter & Jay K. Walker, 2017. "Good Girl, Bad Boy? Evidence Consistent with Collusion in Professional Tennis," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(1), pages 155-180, July.
    6. Marco Di Domizio & Mattia Palombini, 2011. "Competitività orizzontale e verticale nel ciclismo professionistico: alcune riflessioni sul circuito pro tour," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 6(3), pages 35-54, Febbraio.
    7. Caruso, Raul & Di Domizio, Marco, 2013. "International hostility and aggressiveness on the soccer pitch Evidence from European Championships and World Cups for the period 2000-2012," MPRA Paper 50099, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Football; Sport Contest; Contest Management; Match-Fixing; Tacit Collusion; Asymmetry in evaluation; Concession; FIFA; UEFA; World Cup; Champions League;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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